Introduction
Six of the countries in Southern Africa -Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland -have been independent for well over a decade. Over that period their governments have to varying degrees initiated profound social and economic change. Economic structures are now more diversified, and the real value of production has been greatly increased. More of the incomes flowing from this production are retained nationally, ie flow increasingly to citizen rather than to metropolitan interests. Progress has been made toward 'citizenising' the labour force. Major increases in social services provision, particularly of education and health, have been made. Many more adjustments will take place, but in each of these states the economy and polity is set on a course which promotes change within an established framework.
The other countries within the region are rather different. For Mozambique and Angola, inde- pendence from Portugal has been won very recently. The wars in each of these countries disrupted industrial and agricultural production, causing major resource problems and, in particular, bringing scarcities of food, foreign exchange and investible resources. Acute shortages of skilled workers have been exacerbated by the departure of most of the Portuguese settlers. Decisions have been taken by these governments to bring about needed changes in patterns of ownership, production and distribution. But the structural changes which these entail are still very much under way, with solutions to some of the key strategy questions facing each nation still being sought.
In the remaining two countries considered in this paper -Zimbabwe and Namibia -such changes are yet to begin. Zimbabwe's independence came only a few months ago. In Namibia it has yet to be won. The illegal minority governments of these countries have ruled in the context of discriminatory economic, social and political structures which have systematically and pervasively benefited mainly a tiny white minority. The transition to legitimate majority rule is likely to be followed by shifts in production and employment relations which may be no less profound than those currently underway in Mozambique and Angola. In some ways, however, the problems here may be even more extreme. The likely exodus of whites will create exceptionally severe shortages of local skills, and the problems of maintaining output whilst tackling the pressing need for social and economic reconstruction will be extremely severe.
The fact that these 10 countries are at such different stages in the transitional process implies that within the region a very wide range of employment problems -different in scale and, often, in kindare to be found. But in spite of this diversity, there are common problems. This paper selects two: migrant labour and skill shortages, particularly in the formal sector. It is argued that these problems may best be tackled by an approach which, inter alia, aims to reduce the heavy dependence of individual countries on South Africa, and to exploit the complementary strengths and opportunities provided by other countries within the region.
Migration for Work Abroad
The 10 Southern African countries, excluding South Africa (RSA) have a combined population of over 55 million, and a combined national product of over US $8 billion per annum -approximately $150 per capita. About one-eighth of the labour force is in receipt of regular wages or salaries from formal employment. The 3.5 million formal jobs in the region include 250,000 currently held by Europeans, and a further 500,000 held by migrant Africans working in RSA or Zimbabwe. One in six of all formally employed Africans in the region as a whole (excluding RSA) are migrant workers. Table  I provides estimates of the scale of this migration for each country. Those most severely affected by Nevertheless, except in Lesotho, and to a lesser extent in Botswana, the problem of re-absorption of migrants is manageable (albeit difficult and costly) for the majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa -particularly when compared with the much bigger problem of under-utilisation of domestic labour, and with the rapid annual growth of the domestic labour force. The rural sector in each country will have to absorb most of these additional workers. To this end, long-term national policies for agricultural and rural development must be devised which aim to provide productive work opportunities for the people who are displaced from abroad, and for those who are without adequate work at home. Meanwhile the supplier states will wish to maximise the domestic benefits from the migrant labour system as long as it continues to operate, and to prepare contingency arrangements which would reduce the costs of a sudden reduction or termination of the present opportunities facing migrant workers. Desirable action at the regional and international levels is discussed in the final section of this article.
Problems in the Skilled Labour Market
Historical background Throughout the region, modern production structures were established during the colonial period without the creation of the required skills among the indigenous population. Most of these states were settler colonies; the colonialists came to stay, profiting enormously from the territories' resources. Education was typically provided by the missionary societies. Metropolitan governments were parsimonious, and expenditure on education in the colonies won few votes. The missionaries, however, needed to educate the heathen in order to convert him, and also needed local rather than metropolitan support. This provided a convenient division of interests, and colonial governments were content to leave the provision of education (and health) services largely to other agencies.
In most countries of Southern Africa, however, education and training were neglected not only because of the expense involved but also as a means of preventing Africans and Europeans from competing on equal terms in the labour market. In Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, the colonists reinforced these policies with job reservation and other mechanisms in order to divide whites and blacks into non-competing groups. Outside RSA itself, such labour policies took their most extreme form in these two territories, but their elements were present in varying degrees throughout the region prior to independence.
As a result, post-primary education and training prior to independence covered only a tiny proportion of the population. Although mission secondary schools often provided education of a high standard, this rarely went beyond a basic three-year post-primary cycle. In part as a result of this emphasis, progress has been made in localising the labour force in all these countries: in every case, non-citizen workers now comprise less than one-tenth of formal employment (Table 1) , and the influence wielded by foreign workers has been much reduced. Although some further expansion of university and technical training facilities is desirable, in general the institutional facilities to provide the required skills already exist. The major problem is in making them function effectively, and in ensuring that training, employment and incentive structures reflect changing priorities on a year-to-year basis.
Mozambique and Angola are at a much earlier stage in dealing with these problems. Their education policies are closer to those of Tanzania: emphasis is put upon basic literacy, and therefore upon primary and adult education; education is strongly integrated with work -both during and after completion of each stage of schooling; strong emphasis is placed upon worker education, and the government organises many small training courses for worker upgrading. Quantitatively, these countries face localisation problems greater than those of Zambia. Precise magnitudes cannot yet be assessed, and the establishment of such data will presumably be an early priority.
Namibia and Zimbabwe will also have special problems. These countries have relatively well developed production structures, making themrelative to the distribution of populations -the richest nations in the Southern African region outside RSA. However, as the papers by Green and Riddell show, owing to the racialist policies which have been pursued in education and training, the maintenance of these production levels is at present highly dependent upon the skills held by white settlers and expatriates.
The transition to legitimate majority rule in each of these countries will bring1 radical changes in production relations, particularly in agriculture, mining and manufacturing, with land reforms and increased state participation in production; radical shifts in the nature and pattern of provision of services, particularly in health and education; probable sharp changes in the distribution of net earnings from work, with large average reductions at the top. One consequence of these changes will be a major exodus of whites -particularly those in more skilled or senior positions.
In many ways this is highly desirable. In Namibia, a large proportion of the whites have South African nationality, and their continuation -particularly in government service -would be inappropriate. Ingrained colonial attitudes will not be helpful under new arrangements. As a result, however, major gaps will be created amongst the most skilled and experienced sections of the labour force.
In aggregate terms, this could mean the loss of between Il and 15 per cent of the formally employed labour force in both countries. But between 70 and 80 per cent of the skilled labour force is likely to be lost -more than 25,000 skilled persons from Namibia, and as many as 50-100,000 in the case of Zimbabwe. Most of these skills will economic position (eg as a result of international sanctions or if the armed struggle moves into South Africa itself). In this situation, a range of actions at the regional and international levels are desirable.
Regional initiatives. The supplier states have an interest in coordinating their policies on migrant labour. To this end, meetings were held during 1978 in Lusaka to discuss matters of common concern. Negotiations with the mines for improving working and living conditions will be more effective if all supplier states speak with a common voice. There is also much to be gained from reviewing alternative national policies for the re-absorption of returning migrants in the event of rapid change in the political or economic circumstances of the
Republic.
An area of common interest is the fees collected from labour recruiters. Apart from the small charges made for recruitment licences, 'attestation' fees are currently levied by the supplier states on a per capita basis. These vary between R5 per labourer recruited in Swaziland and R15 in Lesotho. The evidence suggests that if all supplier states were to adopt the same level of attestation fees for mine work, the level of charges could be raised very substantially without significantly reducing the flow of recruits in the short-term.
Fees of even Rl00 per recruit would increase
African labour costs in the mines by less than ten per cent -far less than the tax revenue raised by the South African Government on the profits and other incomes generated by migrant workers.
International cooperation. Other initiatives require both regional and international cooperation. Swaziland and Botswana, but especially Lesotho, would require substantial additional aid in the event of a sudden contraction of employment opportunities in South Africa, in order to avoid huge income losses to the poorer families. The scale of transfers would be at least of the order of $5 mn, $20 mn and $100 mn per year respectively, if full compensation were to be provided. In Swaziland and Botswana, domestic employment policies can be designed for absorbing repatriated migrant labourers within the medium-term. The case of Lesotho is different; large amounts of aid will be needed over the long-term if that country's present dependence upon employment in South Africa is
removed.
An urgent study of employment possibilities in -the training of science, engineering, and medical technicians is such a large and urgent priority that most countries will wish to establish their own facilities. BLS and Namibia may wish to explore the possibility of using facilities in other countries in the region on grounds of cost effectiveness, but even in these-countries, national programmes would in most cases be viable. It would seem sensible to integrate this 'tertiary' level training in one national institution: the Malawian polytechnic concept appears particularly relevant. The danger is that the unit cost of training may be pulled up by association with university departments, rather than vice versa; but this need not necessarily be the case.
Regional cooperation in tertiary level training does not involve the creation of new joint universities or colleges. Recent experience with UBLS 38 demonstrates the inevitability of tension if national funds are used to build up jointly owned facilities in other countries. But unless students from one country can be trained in another, many tertiary level courses will not be viable. If regional training initiatives are to succeed, capital costs must be met from external sources, as part of a technical cooperation programme financed by the international community. This would be separate from, and in addition to, monies received by individual countries through existing bi-lateral and multilateral channels. For some countries, also, provision of recurrent costs will be important because of foreign exchange constraints. For a host state to be willing, over the long or even mediumterm, to provide a substantial number of places for citizens of other states, it must receive the full recurrent costs either from the sending states or through international cooperation. Such financial guarantees would facilitate the negotiation of medium-term cost-sharing agreements for particular tertiary level courses.
Temporary expatriate manpower
Namibia and Zimbabwe combined may need the temporary assistance of up to 75,000 skilled expatriates during the early post-independence period (Green's figure of 15,000-17,500 for Namibia, together with author's estimate of about 60 per cent of the present level of white employment in Zimbabwe). Holding post-independence requirements down to these levels would represent and require a significant step towards Africanising the labour force, But, relative to the size of the national populations, this still implies very large technical cooperation programmes.
If one-third of these recruits were financed through technical cooperation arrangements, the costs to the international community would be around £300 mn per year at current rates. Full use could be made in recruitment of friendly governments and agencies. If the destabilising presence of 'unsuitable' expatriates is to be avoided, it is important that a high proportion of these foreign personnel are interviewed and selected by Namibians and Zimbabweans themselves. Strong recruitment 'vetting' offices could usefully be established by the two governments. One aim is likely to be the recruitment of technical cooperation personnel from other friendly Third World countries with specific skilled labour surpluses. Some countries in the region have already initiated technical cooperation agreements with Nigeria and with India. Such programmes could usefully be initiated in Zimbabwe and in Namibia after its transition to majority rule.
